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1 Introduction
In 1999 lovastatin, a blockbuster cholesterol drug with peak sales of more than $1 billion
in the U.S., became commercially available in Egyptótwelve years after it was Örst ap-
proved for sale by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. As we will show, this is not
exceptionalólong launch lags are common and nearly 40 percent of all new drugs are only
launched in ten or fewer countries. Since delayed launch means foregone health beneÖts, it is
important to understand how public policy a§ects the di§usion of new drug innovations. In
this paper we demonstrate that the patent and price regulation policies governments adopt
have a powerful impact on the speed at which new drugs become available in di§erent
countries.
Promoting a§ordable access to new drugs is a central objective of government policy.
There are two distinct challenges in achieving this: how to provide adequate incentives for
the development of new drugs, and how to ensure a§ordable prices of drugs once they are
developed. Governments use two main instruments to achieve these goals: patents and price
regulation. It is well known that there is a tension between these objectives. The innovation
literature emphasizes the basic tradeo§ between the dynamic gains from stronger incentives
to develop new technology provided by patents and the static welfare loss created by the
resulting higher prices.1 Much of the policy debate around patents and ìaccessî to new
medicines has focused on pricingóthe potential for patent-protected products to leave large
numbers of patients priced out the market in countries with limited private health insurance
and poorly funded public health systems. As many poorer countries have been required to
provide patent protection for pharmaceutical products under the 1994 TRIPS Agreement,
patent policy has largely been evaluated in terms of the static welfare loss associated with
higher prices in emerging markets (Chaudhuri, Goldberg and Gia, 2006; Duggan and Goyal,
2012; Kyle and Qian, 2013).2
In the debates over the TRIPS Agreement (and more recently, the proposed TranspaciÖc
Partnership trade agreement), developing countries and public health advocacy groups ar-
gued that harmonization of patent policy was both unnecessary and harmful when viewed
1The classic statement of the tradeo§ is Arrow (1962), which spawned a huge literature. Empirical
studies of the impact of patent rights on the rate and direction of innovation are more recent, and include
Branstetter and Sakakibara (2001), Moser (2005), Qian (2007), Kyle and McGahan (2012), Williams (2013),
Galasso and Schankerman (2013), and Budish, Roin and Williams (2014).
2TRIPS is the acronym for the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
which is administered by the World Trade Organization. For discussion of the political economy of TRIPS
and other international trade-related agreements, see Sell (2006). Grossman and Lai (2004) provide a
theoretical analysis of patent regimes in a trading world economy with di§erent market sizes and capacity
for innovation; also see related work by Scotchmer (2004) There have also been studies of how price
discrimination in pharmaceuticals can help improve global welfare while also preserving innovation incentives
(e.g., Jack and Lanjouw, 2005).
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from the perspective of this tradeo§.3 For low income countries, the welfare loss from
patents involves not just the traditional static e¢ciency cost from prices above marginal
cost, but also the worrying prospect that large segments of the population may have no
a§ordable access to new drug therapies. This has led economists to recommend alternative
ways for governments to provide innovation incentives while maintaining low prices in de-
veloping countries, especially for vaccines.4 Moreover, the increase in innovation incentives
from having patent rights in low income countries is likely to be small for many kinds of
drugs because these countries do not account for a large part of the global market.5
However, this debate misses a critical element: the impact patent rights and other policies
have on the di§usion of new drugs. The public health beneÖts of new drugs depend, Örst,
on how quickly drugs are launched in the ëlocalí markets in di§erent countries and, second,
on how widely they are adopted within a country, once they have been launched. Once a
drug has been discovered, the sunk R&D costs are not relevant to the decision to launch
in di§erent countries. However, the decision to launch in a country, and to develop the
marketing and distribution infrastructure required to promote within-country adoption,
will be sensitive to drug manufacturersí assessment of anticipated proÖts relative to these
country-speciÖc costs. Of course, if these costs were negligible, both aspects of di§usion
would be driven by demand side factorsói.e., heterogeneity in the proÖtability of adoption in
di§erent countries. This is the perspective that has been most emphasized in the economics
literature on di§usion, beginning with the seminal work of Griliches (1957). But di§usion
also has a supply sideósunk investments required to enter new markets, set up distribution
channels and inform potential customers about new products. If launch costs are su¢ciently
large, the di§usion of new technologies will be signiÖcantly ináuenced by policies that a§ect
proÖtability in di§erent markets. This supply-side perspective is at the heart of economic
models of entry (e.g., Bresnahan and Reiss, 1988; Holmes, 2011; Collard-Wexler, 2013),
and has been under-appreciated as a factor limiting di§usion of innovations across di§erent
markets.
Of course, the potential importance of patent rights in promoting global di§usion of inno-
vation is not limited to pharmaceuticals. However, drugs are a good example to study both
3For example, see ìUSTRís proposal for the Intellectual Property Chapter of the Trans-PaciÖc Partner-
ship (TPP) will endanger access to medicines for all,î Public Citizen et al. (February 12, 2014), available
at http://www.citizen.org/statements-of-support
4These include auctions (Kremer, 1998) and bulk purchasing with free distribution (Kremer, 2002;
Kremer and Glennester, 2004). For a good discussion of non-patent incentive mechanisms, see Scotchmer
(2004).
5An important exception to this are drugs for "neglected diseases" whose burden falls disproportionately
on the population of low-income countries. With little or no market for these drugs in high-income coun-
tries, the strength of intellectual property rights in emerging markets could play a larger role in innovation
incentives (Cockburn and Lanjouw, 2005). Again, patents are not the only way to provide incentives to
do R&D in these areas, see e.g. Ridley, Grabowski and Moe (2006) who proposed the transferable Priority
Review Voucher mechanism now implemented in the USA.
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because of their economic importance and because there are signiÖcant, country-speciÖc
costs of launching new drugs.6 These include the costs of conducting additional clinical
trials to meet local requirements, obtaining regulatory approval, setting up local distribu-
tion and marketing networks, and educating healthcare providers. These Öxed costs must
be incurred in every country in which a drug is launched: outside tightly integrated trad-
ing blocs such as the European Union, there are few international protocols that recognize
regulatory approval of drugs across borders, and limited economies of geographic scope in
marketing and distribution. Moreover, the bulk of these entry costs apply whether or not
the Örst entrant in a country is the original innovator of the drug, its licensee or a generic
imitator.
Existing studies on the relationship between intellectual property rights and the spread
of new technologies have focused on two main channels, international trade and technology
transfer by multinational companies. In particular, two recent papers identify these impacts
by exploiting the strengthening of IP rights, mostly associated with the TRIPS Agreement.
Delgado, Kyle and McGahan (2013) show that the timing of implementation of TRIPS
(the compliance date varied across countries) is associated with increased trade áows in
sectors that are IP-intensive relative to a control group. They Önd that the impact varies
substantially across sectors, and notably was larger in the information and communication
technology sector than in biopharmaceuticals, where compliance was subject to more excep-
tions and complementary resources in distribution play a large role. Branstetter, Fishman
and Foley (2006) use Örm-level data to show that royalty payments and R&D expenditures
by multinational a¢liates increase after IP reforms were adopted in sixteen countries (some
before TRIPS) and that this e§ect is concentrated among a¢liates of parent companies
that use U.S. patents extensively prior to the reforms. In both of these papers, the patent
reforms are treated as exogenous events.
There are two main related studies of cross-country di§usion of pharmaceuticals. Kyle
(2007) uses a large data set on new molecules launched in OECD countries from 1980-
2000, and shows that price regulation signiÖcantly retards launches and, interestingly, that
Örms are less likely to follow launch in a low-price country with launch in a high-price
country (possibly due to ëreference pricingí policies by drug price regulators). However,
the paper does not examine the impact of patent rights on drug launch dates, as there is
not much variation among OECD countries. In related research, Kyle (2006) analyzes a
similar sample of drug launches in the smaller set of G7 countries, focusing on how Örm
6A launch decision in one country may depend on policy regimes in other countries. Such ëpolicy
externalitiesí can arise from benchmark pricing formulas (Bloom and van Reneen, 1998; Jacobzone, 2000;
Brekke, Grasdal and Holmas, 2009), and parallel trade that erodes price di§erences across country borders
(Kanavos et. al., 2004; Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004). In this paper we focus on how domestic policies a§ect
launch lags, but do not incorporate these policy externalities. A full treatment of dynamic entry decisions
across markets with spillover e§ects remains an important topic for future research.
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characteristics a§ect launch timing (possibly because they are correlated with unobserved
entry costs).7
In this paper we study how both patent regimes and price regulation, as well as economic
factors such as market size and demographics, a§ect the speed and geographic extent of
di§usion of new pharmaceutical products across countries. The empirical analysis is based
on a large data set that covers launches of 642 new drugs in up to 76 countries during
the period 1983-2002, together with information on the nature and evolution of patent and
price regulation regimes in these countries. Importantly, the countries in the data set span
all levels of economic development, exhibit a wide variety of patent regimes, and changed
important aspects of patent policy with respect to pharmaceuticals over time.
In the analysis we distinguish between two types of patent rights: those that protect of
methods of manufacture (ëprocess patentsí) and those that protect pharmaceutical products
(ëproduct patentsí). Process patents are considered relatively weak, as they do not prevent
cost-based competitive entry by entrants with superior manufacturing processes. Indeed,
some countries (such as India) purposefully adopted a ìprocess-onlyî patent regime for
pharmaceutical innovations in order to foster a domestic industry based on inventing around
originatorsí manufacturing processes. Product patents are typically considered stronger
rights, blocking entry by competitive (or generic) products and allowing for more e§ective
appropriation of rents. However, there is a wide variation across countries (and over time
within countries) in both the duration and content of both process and product patents,
which provides the potential for identifying the e§ects of regime choice on di§usion.
There are four main empirical Öndings in the paper. First, we show that new drugs
become available in many countries only after long lags (often more than 10 years) between
the date when a product in Örst launched commercially anywhere in the world (typically in
the US, Europe, or Japan) and its launch in other countries. Many new drugs are never
launched outside a handful of wealthier countries. Second, we demonstrate that the patent
policies governments adopt strongly a§ect how quickly new drug therapies are launched
in their countries. Longer duration, and stronger, patent rights substantially speed up
di§usion. These impacts are large and robust to a variety of empirical speciÖcations. For
example, controlling for economic and demographic factors, moving from a regime of no
product patents to a long product patent term increases the per-period hazard of launch by
about 23 percent. Allowing for endogeneity of policy regimes using instrumental variables
increases the magnitude of estimated e§ect to between 64 percent and 72 percent, depending
on the choice of instruments. This is equivalent to reducing launch lags by about 100
percent. Short product patents have no e§ect. Process patents also promote faster launch,
7Other studies that use much smaller samples of drugs/countries include Danzon, Wang and Wang
(2005), and Berndt, Blalock and Cockburn (2011).
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but the impact is not as large as for product patents. Importantly, we Önd that these e§ects
hold equally for low and middle income countries as for high income countries.
Third, we show that countries that adopt strong pharmaceutical price regulation expe-
rience signiÖcantly longer launch lags for new drugs. We estimate that introducing price
regulation decreases the per-period hazard of launch by about 15 percent, which is equiv-
alent to increasing launch lags by about 25 percent (when instrumented, 49 to 60 percent
reduction in the hazard rate, equivalent to about a 80 percent to 100 percent increase in
launch lags.) Fourth, we Önd that new drugs are launched much faster in countries that
have health policy institutions that promote availability and distribution of drugsóin par-
ticular, adopting the Essential Drug List of the World Health Organization and having a
National Formularyóand these institutions do not appear to be simply a proxy for unob-
served institutional quality.
Finally, we Önd that local market size, as captured by population, per capita income,
health expenditures, and demographic factors ináuencing drug use) has a big impact on
the speed of drug launches. These results are consistent with earlier studies of U.S. data
showing that market size is related to both higher levels of pharmaceutical innovation and
non-generic entry (e.g., Scott-Morton, 1999; Acemoglu and Linn, 2004; Dubois, Mouzon,
Scott Morton and Seabright, 2011).
All of these key Öndings are robust to using a variety of instrumental variables, based
primarily on a countryís political and legal institutions, to address potential concern about
endogeneity of policy regimes. In fact, the estimated impacts of price regulation and patent
policy using instruments (in a full information maximum likelihood framework) are, as
indicated above, higher than those in the baseline speciÖcations of the hazard model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple dynamic model of drug
launches, as a framework for interpreting our empirical results. In Section 3 we describe the
data set (details are provided in the Data Appendix). Section 4 presents non-parametric
evidence on the geographic and temporal di§usion of new drugs, and how it varies with the
economic development and patent and price regulation regimes. We describe the speciÖca-
tion of the hazard model of drug launches in Section 5.1 and the main econometric results
in Section 5.2. In Section 6 we present robustness analysis. In Section 7 we show that the
results are robust to using instruments to address the endogeneity of policy regimes. Section
8 uses our parameter estimates to simulate the impact of counterfactual policy regimes on
drug di§usion. In the conclusion we summarize the key Öndings and directions for future
research.
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2 A Model of Drug Launch
Consider a Örm that has developed a new drug i which can be launched in a set of countries,
denoted by j = 1; :::; J: The Örm obtains a product patent on the drug in each country at
time t = 0:8 Patent protection lasts for Tj periods in country j. After the patent expires,
we assume that generic competition drives the price to marginal cost.
If the Örm launches the drug in country j, it incurs a sunk entry cost of ij :9 During
patent protection, the Örm earns áow proÖt in period t equal to (xij)!ijt, where xij denotes
a vector of variables that capture market size, regulation and health institutions, and de-
mographic characteristics of the country. In our analysis, we use three variables to capture
market size, population, GDP per capita, and health expenditures per GDP. Regulatory
variables include measures of the duration and strength of patent policies (both for phar-
maceutical products and processes, as explained later) and price controls. Demographic
variables include the fraction of the population over 65 and a measure of income inequality.
The variable !ijt denotes a proÖtability shock that reáects unobservable factors a§ecting
demand and productivity. For simplicity, in the model (though not in the empirical work),
we treat xij as constant over time.
We assume !ijt evolves as a Örst-order Markov process
!ijt = !ij;t1 + i + j + ijt (1)
where  2 (0; 1); i and j denote drug and country-speciÖc random e§ects, respectively,
which we assume the Örm knows, and ijt is an iid disturbance. The random e§ects allow
the proÖtability shock !ijt to be correlated across countries for a given drug, and across
drugs for a given country.10 The Markov speciÖcation implies that Pr(!ijt j !ij;t1) is
stochastically increasing in !ij;t1:
The present value of launch at time t, conditional on available information, is
E(Vijt j !ijt; i; j) =
TjtX
k=0
kf(xij)E(!ij;t+k j !ijt; i; j)g  ij
8The Örst country in which a patent is applied for sets the global priority date. International patent
protocols require that the inventor apply for protection in other countries within 18 months of the priority
date, after which the right expires. As an empirical matter, the launch of new drugs often occurs much later
than the patent application date. Our assumption that the drug is patented in all countries is made for
simplicity only.
9The entry cost includes the cost of obtaining regulatory approval in the target country (there is no
mechanism for multi-country regulatory review), investment in physical distribution channels, information
provision to doctors and pharmacies, and securing registration on the national drug formulary. These costs
can vary substantially both with the type of drug and the country of launch.
10The random e§ects speciÖcation implies that E(!ijt!i0jt) = 
2
 and E(!ijt!ij0t) = 
2
 for i 6= i0 and
j 6= j0:
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where  2 (0; 1) is the discount rate. The Örm launches the drug in country j when
E(Vijt j !ijt; i; j)  0: Given the Markov assumption on !; the optimal entry rule is
to launch the drug when the proÖt shock !ijt exceeds a threshold level, !ijt (Ericson and
Pakes, 1995). Essentially, this rule applies because the value function E(Vijt j !ijt; i; j) is
increasing in !ijt:
The Örst-order Markov assumption delivers a simple closed-form solution for !ijt: From
equation (1),
!ij;t+k = 
k!ijt + (i + j)
k1X
m=0
m +
k1X
m=0
mij;t+km k > 0
which implies
E(!ij;t+k j !ijt; i; j) = k!ijt + (i + j)
k1X
m=0
m
since E(ij;t0 j !ijt; i; j) = 0 for t0 > t: Thus
E(Vijt j !ijt; i; j) = !ijt(xij)
TjtX
k=t
k + (Tj  t)(i + j) ij (2)
where  =  2 (0; 1) and (Tjt) = 1+
PTjt
k=1 
kPk1
m=0 
m: Setting E(Vijt j !ijt; i; j) =
0; the entry condition is
!ijt  !ijt =
ij  (Tj  t)(i + j)
(xij)
1Tjt+1
1
(3)
The entry threshold !ijt is determined by Zijt = (xij ; Tj ; t; i; j) which we assume
the Örm observes. The threshold is declining in patent duration Tj and variables that
increase áow proÖt (xij); including the duration and strength of patent rights, and rising
in the sunk entry cost ij ; elapsed time since Örst worldwide launch t; and price regulation
which reduces áow proÖt. The threshold increases with time since Örst worldwide launch t
because, when the remaining patent period Tj t is smaller, the proÖt shock must be larger
to generate su¢cient expected áow proÖts to cover the entry cost.
The probability that the drug is launched in country j at time t; given that it has not
been launched before (the hazard rate), is
h(t j Zijt) = Pr(!ijt  !ijt j !ij1 < !ij1; :::; !ij;t1 < !ij;t1)
= Pr(!ijt  !ijt j !ij;t1 < !ij;t1) (4)
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where the second equality follows from the Örst-order Markov assumption on !: This implies
that the hazard rate is a decreasing function of factors that raise the threshold !ijt:This is
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition: The hazard rate of drug launch in a country is increasing in factors that
increase áow proÖt, including the duration and strength of patent protection, population,
GDP per capita, health expenditures per GDP and the fraction of population over 65. The
hazard rate of drug launch is declining in price regulation which reduces áow proÖt, and in
the time elapsed since Örst launch and the sunk cost of entry.
In the empirical analysis we estimate a hazard model of drug launch to examine some
of these predictions..
3 Data and Measurement
In this section we brieáy describe the construction of the data set. Details of the procedures
and sources are provided in the Data Appendix.
Identifying drug launches
A launch is deÖned as the Örst appearance of the identiÖed molecule (new chemical
entity) in a given country, whether in proprietary or generic form. Determining if, and
when, a new drug becomes available in a given country is not straightforward. Since almost
all countries require formal approval from a health and safety regulator before a drug can
be marketed, administrative records could potentially be used for this purpose. But poor
record keeping in some countries, lack of easily accessible public records, and language
barriers make it infeasible to track regulatory approvals for large numbers of drugs across
many countries, particularly for historical data. Regulatory approvals also do not directly
track commercial availability (formal approval is not the same as de facto launch of a
product).
We rely on a compilation of product launches obtained from a commercial market re-
search company, IMS Health Inc. This database tracks product launches in all therapeutic
classes in up to 76 di§erent countries from 1983-2002. Product launches were identiÖed by
IMS from a variety of sources, including regulatory approvals, announcements by manufac-
turers, local media reports, and IMSí active surveillance of distribution channels as part
of other data gathering e§orts. Because India was not covered by IMS during this period,
we supplement this data source with information from an Indian market research company,
ORG/MARG, that tracked product launches in a limited set of therapeutic over the same
period.
To track launches accurately, drugs must be unambiguously identiÖed across countries.
Unfortunately there is considerable variation across time and over countries in how a given
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chemical entity is named.11 Failing to recognize equivalent chemical entities will result in
over-counting of new products, under-counting of the number of countries in which a given
drug is launched, and inaccurate dating of launches. As detailed in the Data Appendix, it
took considerable e§ort to track the history of drug launches in these data due to changes in
country coverage, and di¢culties in consistently identifying drugs due to variations in prod-
uct names. The source dataset contains more than 180,000 observations on product-country
launches. These products contained approximately 9,600 distinct active drug ingredients in
use around the world during the sample period, for which we compiled more than 250,000
synonyms from a variety of reference sources. Of these 9,600 distinct active ingredients we
focus on 642 clearly identiÖable chemical entities that were Örst introduced anywhere in the
world during this period, and then identify the date when they Örst appear in any product
launched in each country. Several important choices were made in creating this dataset
to minimize under-counting of launches. We excluded products in a variety of therapeutic
classes where it was particularly di¢cult to identify active ingredients unambiguously.12 We
also used a relatively broad deÖnition of what constitutes an equivalent chemical entity by
grouping together all of the salts and esters of a given ëactive moietyí. This procedure may
ignore clinically important di§erences among variants that would lead a pharmacologist to
distinguish between di§erent products, but it makes our results conservative in the sense
that we may be over-counting launches of equivalent products. Because the country cover-
age of the source data expanded over time (and ënewí countries appeared, such as the Czech
Republic and Slovakia) we were careful to account for left-censoring of launches (i.e. drugs
were excluded from being ëat riskí of launch in a country if their Örst worldwide launch
occurred prior to entry of the country into the dataset.)
Patent and price control regimes
For each country in our sample, we characterize the domestic patent regime along four
dimensions: duration of patent term, coverage of pharmaceutical products, coverage of
chemical manufacturing processes, and an index of the strength of patent protection that
reáects the degree to which patent law provisions favor patent holders versus potential in-
fringers (Pro-patent Index, which varies from zero to one). The variables are constructed
using data from Ginarte and Park (1997), Park (2008) and other reference sources cited
in the Data Appendix. These variables change slowly over time, and while there is consid-
erable convergence towards the ìTRIPS standardî (e.g., 20 year term, no exceptions for
pharmaceutical products) by the end of the sample period, there was considerable variation
11For example, the drug known as acetominophen in North America is known as paracetamol in most
other countries, and is sold under more than 50 di§erent brand names around the world.
12These include product classes such as dermatologicals, where the boundary between prescription drugs,
over-the-counter medicines and personal care products is particularly blurred, and vaccines and biologics
where nomenclature was not well standardized during this period.
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among countries during the 1980ís and 1990ís.
We have no reason to believe that the relationship between patent term and the hazard of
drug launch is linear. Rather than impose a functional form, we use three mutually exclusive
dummy variables to capture patent term duration: Short = 0 < duration  12 years (from
application date); Medium = 13  duration  17 and Long = duration  18 (the reference
category is no patent protection).13 Note that since the average period between patent appli-
cation and marketing approval on a product is about 10 years (Grabowski and Kyle, 2007), a
Short patent conveys essentially no e§ective coverage to the patentee. We use two separate
sets of these dummy variables, one for product patents (Short_Product, Medium_Product
and Long_Product) and another for process patents (Short_Process, Medium_Process and
Long_Process). In terms of country/year observations, short, medium and long process
patents account for 10.8, 22.3 and 60.0 percent of the sample; for product patents the Ög-
ures are 6.4, 16.5 and 58.2 percent, respectively. We experimented with di§erent deÖnitions
of the cuto§s for these patent duration categories: Short 0-10, 0-11 and 0-13; Medium 11-16,
12-16, 13-16, 13-17 and 14-16; and Long  17,  18 and  19. As we discuss later, the
econometric results presented in Section 5 are generally robust to these alternatives.
Countries approach the control of pharmaceutical prices in a bewildering variety of
ways. We consider systems of explicit price regulation and summarize the variation across
countries with two dummy variablesóone for the existence of ìsomeî price regulation and
the second for ìextensiveî price control. A price regime is labeled as ìextensiveî if all drugs
are regulated, rather than just a subset of the market, or if a countryís price regulation is
identiÖed by commentators as being particularly rigorous. The set of reports and legal
texts consulted in making this determination are given in Lanjouw (2005). In the sample,
22 percent of country/year observations are coded as having no price controls, 31 percent
with some price regulation and 47 percent with extensive controls.14
Pharmaceutical policy institutions
The observed timing of market entry reáects both the decisions of Örms and the ef-
Öciency of a countryís regulatory process. We capture government policies that promote
access to pharmaceuticals by coding three dummy variables for each country-year. The Örst
is whether a country had adopted a national formulary, where listed drugs would be eligible
for distribution through a publicly funded health system, typically more widely prescribed,
13Where the patent term runs from date of grant rather than date of application, as was the case in e.g.
the U.S. prior to 1995, we added two years to make the term roughly equivalent to one running from date
of application. Results were not sensitive to changing this assumption about the pendency period to three
years.
14Appendix Table 1 provides information, for each country in the sample, on the number of years of
coverage, number of drugs launched, average percentage of drugs launched within 5 years of their initial
launch date anywhere, and the product patent, process patent, and price regulation regimes and their
changes over time.
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and with payment mechanisms in place. The second is whether a country had adopted the
Essential Drug List (EDL) promulgated by the World Health Organization, which indicates
that a countryís health institutions are oriented towards promoting access to basic drugs.
The third is whether a country has a formal ìnational drug policy,î i.e. an e§ort to co-
ordinate industrial policy and domestic regulation to promote access to safe and e§ective
pharmaceuticals. At the start of our sample period, 65 percent of countries had a national
formulary, 41 percent had adopted the EDL and 63 percent had issued a national drug
policy; by 1997 all countries had adopted all three.
Demographic and Income Variables
We use a set of income and demographic variables to control for variations in the po-
tential demand for pharmaceuticals. These include: population size and the fraction of
population over 65 years old, real GDP per capita in purchasing power parity terms, in-
come inequality measured by the Gini coe¢cient, and health care expenditures as a percent
of GDP. We also include measures of the quality of regulatory bureaucracy and the rule of
law, both taken from the World Bank.
Many of the explanatory variables are available annually, but others only in one or
several cross-sections (details in the Data Appendix). Table 1 presents summary statistics
for the variables used in the econometric analysis.
4 Drug Di§usion: Non-parametric Evidence
We begin with some non-parametric evidence on the pattern of global drug di§usion. Table
2 presents information on the geographic span of drug launches, and shows the distribution
of the number of countries for which a launch was observed for each drug in the sample.
Recognizing that this tabulation does not account for right-censoring (some drugs may
have launched in some countries after the sample period ends), these statistics illustrate
the dominant, and striking, feature of this measure of di§usion: how limited it is. In the
entire sample of new drugs, 39 percent were launched in ten or fewer countries, and only 41
percent were launched in more than 25 countries. The mean number of countries in which
a drug was launched is 22.4 (median of 18) out of a possible 76. The fact that drugs are
not launched more widely can be due to various factors: the limited size and demographic
features of markets, and the availability of substitutes, may limit anticipated demand to a
level that does not justify the cost of entry; di§erences in disease patterns across countries;
and rejection by some local regulatory authorities. Even among the wealthier countries
with most developed health care systems, not all of these drugs became available during the
sample period: the USA, Germany, and the UK, for example, saw launches of only about
60 percent of the sample of drugs. The limited availability of new drugs (at least by this
11
measure) suggests a substantial welfare loss. The good news from a welfare perspective is
that the geographic di§usion is substantially wider for the (arguably) higher quality drugsó
as proxied by those obtaining approval from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, which
is among the most stringent regulatory agencies in the world (column 3), and the subset of
FDA-approved drugs that pass a priority review screening (column 4).15 For these drugs,
more than half are eventually launched in more than 25 countries (though with long lags,
as we will see later). But even among these high quality new drugs, 13 percent were only
launched in three or less countries within the sample period.
Because launch lags (the time elapsed between Örst worldwide launch and launch in
a given country) can be long and the sample is truncated at 2002, Table 2 likely under-
represents the true extent of di§usion. To examine the temporal aspects of di§usion, and
to address this potential undercounting of launches, in Table 3 and Figures 1 through
4 we present results from nonparametric analyses of time-until-launch that estimate the
distribution of launch lags allowing for right-censoring. Figures plot the Kaplan-Meier
ëfailureí function (i.e., 1  S^t where S^t is the estimated survival function) while the table
reports only the time corresponding to the 25th percentile of launch lags. A number of
Öndings stand out. First, as shown in Figure 1, even after 10 years, only 41 percent of drug-
country opportunities for a launch were taken up. Even after 20 years or more, less than 50
percent of possible launches had taken place, and as practical matter, many of these drugs
may never be launched in large numbers of countries. While not all of the country-years
in which a drug was not launched necessarily represent welfare losses (some drugs may
have become obsoleted by advances in technology, may have no value in contexts where
important complementary technologies or resources for health care are not available, or
may only be useful for treating diseases with very low incidence in a country), this evidence
of limited di§usion is nonetheless very disappointing from a welfare perspective. Even
in the subsample of FDA-approved drugs, only 54 percent were launched in the average
country within 10 years. (Di§usion of non-FDA-approved drugs was much slower and less
extensive, with 19 percent of drug-country launch opportunities Ölled within 10 years.)
Second, delays in launching drugs are strongly related to per capita income. Measured
in terms of the estimated time for 25 percent of possible drug-country launches to take
place, the Örst panel of Table 3 shows that the di§usion pattern is strongly related to
market size, as proxied by the level of GDP per capita. (In the regressions that follow, we
will also control for population size). As shown in the Örst column, it takes nine years for
25 percent of drugs to be launched in the average low income country, but only two years
in high income countries. This income-related disparity persists when we focus only on
15Of the 642 drugs in the sample, 66% were approved by the FDA, and 41% of which (27% of the full
sample) were priority-reviewed by the FDA. While we focus on di§usion lags, there is also evidence that
FDA approval times are shorter for more important drugs (Dranove and Meltzer, 1994).
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the higher quality drugs (second and third columns of Table 3). The full distribution of
estimated launch lags broken out by countriesí income level is given in Figure 2. (Medium
income includes both the lower middle and upper middle income categories of the World
Bank.)
Third, the pace and extent of di§usion is strongly associated with a countryís patent
and price regulation regimes. In the second panel of Table 3 and in Figure 3 we show results
broken out by a summary measure of each countryís patent regime. The duration of patent
rights is categorized as None, Short, Medium and Long (recall that we deÖne Short as a
patent term of 10 years or less, Medium as 11 to 16 years and Long as 17 years or longer)
and a country/year observation is assigned to that category if it had either process and/or
product patents in that group. With no patents, the estimated time for 25 percent of drug-
country launch opportunities to be Ölled is eight years, falling to less than 2.6 years with
long-duration patents. In the third panel of Table 3 and in Figure 4 we group observations
where there was either no or weak price regulation versus strong.16 In countries with no
or weak price regulation, the equivalent statistic is three years, rising to Öve where price
regulation is strong. The estimated ëfailureí functions plotted in Figures 3 and 4 are very
di§erent across categories, and the log-rank test for homogeneity strongly rejects the null
of no di§erence across categories: 2(3) = 750 for patent regimes, and 2(2) = 267 for price
controls.
5 Empirical Model and Results
5.1 Econometric SpeciÖcation
To analyze the timing of drug launches more formally, and control for other covariates,
we use a parametric hazard model. A launch is deÖned as the Örst appearance of the
identiÖed molecule (new chemical entity) in a given country, whether in proprietary or
generic form. The launch lag in a country is dated relative to the Örst global launch of the
molecule (measured in days). We adopt the proportional hazard model with the Weibull
distribution. The hazard of launch for drug i in country j at time t can be expressed as
h(t j xij(t)) = t1exij(t)0 (5)
where xij(t) is a set of time-varying covariates and the scalar  > 0 and vector  are
parameters to be estimated. This speciÖcation imposes a monotone hazard rate, but it can
be either increasing ( > 1) or decreasing ( < 1) over time. The model of drug launch in
16 In regressions of the type discussed below we found no statistically discernible distinction between weak
price controls and no price controls.
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Section 2 predicts that the hazard rate declines with t : since the remaining patent duration
falls with t; the threshold proÖtability shock required for launch must be larger to generate
rents to cover the entry cost. The parameter estimates of  presented below conÖrm this
prediction.17 For continuous covariates, the parameter l reported in the tables correspond
to the percentage change in the per period conditional probability (hazard) of launch due
to a unit change in xl (for discrete covariates, e.g., patent and price regulation regimes,
l is the percentage change in moving from the reference category to the focal regime).
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Equivalently, we can interpret the negative of the parameters (scaled by the estimate of )
as the log change in the predicted time to launch.
For any given drug the hazard of launch is likely to di§er across countries for reasons
other than a countryís economic and demographic characteristics and policy regime, for
example if the incidence of the relevant disease varies across countries. We address this
in three ways. First, we include a set of 14 therapeutic class dummies (the ëÖrst levelí
ATC code assigned by the World Health Organization) in all regressions. This allows the
baseline hazard rate to be di§erent for each group of drugs. Second, in all regressions we use
standard errors clustered at the drug-country level. Finally, as one of the robustness checks,
we allow for unobserved heterogeneity across drugs by including a random drug e§ect.
5.2 Baseline Results
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood parameter estimates for various speciÖcations
of the hazard model. In column (1) the control variables include elapsed time since Örst
global launch, the set of patent and price control policy dummies, population and per capita
income to control for market size, a dummy variable for whether the drug was approved by
the FDA (as an indicator of drug quality), and a set of therapeutic class dummies. Note
Örst that the estimate of the Weibull ancillary parameter, , is 0.614, which is statistically
di§erent from one and conÖrms a declining hazard of launch, consistent with the theoretical
model. This estimate is stable across speciÖcations.
Second, as expected, we Önd that a larger population and higher GDP per capita in-
17We also experimented with a log-logistic model that is more áexible in that it can generate a distribution
with a non-monotonic hazard rate. The parameter estimates from that speciÖcation indicated that the
hazard declines over time after a few weeks. This is interesting because it suggests that, unlike in most of
the literature on the di§usion of innovations, learning about the potential proÖtability of markets does not
appear to be an important factor for the global di§usion of drugs ñ if this were the case then we should see
an a hazard rate that increases with time since Örst worldwide launch.
18With time varying covariates, the hazard function at time t must be deÖned conditional on the entire
sequence of covariates up to t; call it Xij(t) = fxij(s) : s  tg: Thus the marginal impact of a covariate on
the survival probability and hence the launch lag will depend on the sequence Xij(t): In our later discussion
of how covariates a§ect predicted launch lags, we focus on the coe¢cients : One can also use the estimated
coe¢cients to compute the marginal e§ect of covariates on the launch lag for each drug-country pair, and
then average these marginal e§ects over pairs using their speciÖc sequence Xij(t): We do not do that here.
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crease the hazard of launch. This Önding that market size is an important determinant
of drug di§usion is consistent with previous studies that document the role of market size
on pharmaceutical innovation and entry (see the Introduction for relevant citations). The
elasticities of the per period hazard of launch with respect to population and per capita
income are 0.074 and 0.247. In terms of their e§ect on launch lags, these are equivalent
to elasticities of about -0.12 and -0.40, respectively. Third, the coe¢cient on the dummy
for FDA-approved drugs conÖrms that these high quality drugs are launched much fasteró
their per period hazard of launch is more than double that of low quality drugs, and their
predicted time to launch is less than one half of the lag for low quality drugs. Finally, there
are signiÖcant di§erences in the speed of drug di§usion across therapeutic classes. Coef-
Öcients on the therapeutic class dummies (not reported in the table) range from -0.81 to
0.26, equivalent to launch lags over 130 percent faster or almost 60 percent slower than the
reference category, and we strongly reject the hypothesis that the coe¢cients on therapeutic
class dummies are jointly zero (p-value < 0.001). This holds for all speciÖcations.
Turning to the key policy variables, the Örst important Önding is that extensive price
controls signiÖcantly delay drug di§usion.19 Having strong price regulation reduces the
hazard of launch by 15 percent, equivalent to 25 percent increase in the predicted launch
lag.20 In addition, both process and product patents have a large e§ect on launch lags. In
interpreting these coe¢cients, it is important to recognize that these dummies are mutually
exclusive within process and within product, but not across product and process. Thus
while the estimated coe¢cient on Short_Process implies that relative to having no patent
protection, a short process patent regimeósuch as that used by India between 1971 and
2005óreduces launch lags by 19 percent, moving to Medium_Process gives an incremen-
tal gain of 13 percent. The coe¢cient on Long_Process is smaller (and not signiÖcant),
suggesting that long process patents may undermine vibrant process-related innovation as
an avenue for entry by indigenous Örms (but caution is warranted, as we later show that
Long_Process is signiÖcant when we use instrumental variables to account for endogeneity
of policy regimes). It should also be noted that the coe¢cient on Short_Process is identiÖed
o§ a relatively small number of observations: only a handful of countries in the sample had
this type of patent regime, and some for only limited periods of time, and it is possible
that the estimated e§ect is confounded with other (unobserved) aspects of their internal
19Of course, Örms can adopt strategies to forestall price regulation or mitigate its e§ects. An interesting
example of this is the study by Ellison and Wolfram (2004), which shows that drug Örms acted to limit price
increases during a period of intensive political discussion of health care reform in the U.S.
20We also tried using two separate dummy variables for weak and strong price regulation in a variety of
speciÖcations not reported here. We consistently found that weak controls have no statistically signiÖcant
e§ect on launch lags. Therefore, in all speciÖcations reported in the paper we use only one dummy variable
for strong regulation, and combine country/year observations with weak and no controls as the reference
group.
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market. One of these countries was India, which may be a special case in terms of the size of
its internal market and success in developing a highly competitive export-oriented generic
sector during this period.
The parameters also show that long product patents have a powerful e§ect on di§u-
sion. Short product patents, Short_Product ( 10 years), and medium product patents,
Medium_Product, do not have strongly signiÖcant e§ects relative to no patent protection,
which is what would be expected given the long development and regulatory lags (and the
fact that patents are taken out very early in the R&D process to ensure priority). However,
long product patents (Long_Product) reduce launch lags by 55 percent.21 In addition to
patent term, the content of patent protection also matters for di§usion. The point estimate
of the Pro-patent Index is statistically signiÖcant and implies that a one standard deviation
increase in the index reduces predicted launch lags by about 11.3 percent.22
It is also worth pointing out that patent rights can a§ect the direction, as well as the
speed, of drug di§usion. Strong patent rights may be particularly important for inducing
launch of drugs that are only useful for treating smaller patient populations. Non-patent
advantages over competitors (e.g., market frictions, Örst mover advantages etc.) may be
su¢cient for Örst entrants to recover Öxed costs of entry for blockbuster drugs, but this will
typically not be the case for other types of drugs.
In column (2) we examine how health expenditures, in addition to the overall level
of purchasing power, a§ect the incentives to launch in a country. To do this, we include
both the logs of GDP per capita and the percentage of GDP that is devoted to health
expenditures. This sharply reduces the impact of GDP per capita (the implied elasticity
on launch lags falls from -0.40 to -0.04), but the e§ect is picked up by health expenditures
(elasticity on launch lags of -0.51). Adding the two coe¢cients, the implied elasticity of
the time to launch with respect to health expenditures per capita is -0.55. The coe¢cients
on the process and product patent regimes are generally robust, except for the Pro-patent
Index where the coe¢cient declines by half, and the coe¢cients on Short_Product and
Medium_Product, where Short_Product becomes much smaller and statistically insigniÖ-
cant and Medium_Product increases to about one half the magnitude of Long_Product and
21Taken at face value, this regression speciÖcation would also imply that the product and process e§ects
are additive: e.g., a country with Medium_Process and Long_Product would have 32.4 + 54.5 =95% lower
launch lags. In fact, since the patent terms likely overlap substantial, the actual period of market exclusivity
for the patent holder will be close to the longer of the patent terms, and the impact on launch lags is better
estimated by the largest of the two coe¢cients rather than their sum.
22As indicated in Section 3, we tried using di§erent deÖnitions of the patent term for both process and
product patents. The parameter estimates are similar to those reported in Table 4. The only notable
di§erences occur when we deÖne long patents as  17 years (rather than the baseline deÖnition  18). In
that case, the point estimates of the coe¢cients on Medium_Process and Long_Product decline by about
a third (though the di§erences are not statistically signiÖcant), and the coe¢cient on Long_Process is now
positive and statistically signiÖcant.
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becomes strongly signiÖcant. (These coe¢cients are stable across the all the speciÖcations
that control for health expenditures.)
Column (3) expands the set of control variables to include the Gini index of income
inequality, the fraction of elderly in the population (another dimension of e§ective market
size), and three health policy ëinstitutionsí. The Örst, and most important, observation
is that the estimated coe¢cients on the price regulation and patent regime variables are
robust to adding these new controls. Second, drugs are launched faster in countries with
more elderly in the population, and the implied impact is largeóa standard deviation
increase in the fraction of population over age 65 reduces launch lags by 21 percent. Third,
we Önd that, for a given level of GDP per capita, the distribution of income is a signiÖcant
determinant of market entry. Greater income inequality (higher Gini) increases the speed
of di§usion signiÖcantlyóthe coe¢cient implies that a standard deviation rise in the Gini
index reduces launch lags by 23 percent. The likely reason is that greater inequality makes
it more likely that there are at least some elements in the population (the ëwealthy eliteí)
that can a§ord to buy the drugs.23
Next we use dummy controls for three health policy institutionsówhether the country
has a national formulary, an essential drug list, and a national drug policy. The essential
drug list and national formulary play two roles. They facilitate the distribution of drugs to
the population, which should increase e§ective market size and thus promote earlier drug
launches. At the same time, they signal more e§ective institutions for implementing any
price control regimes that may be in place, which would reduce incentives to launch. Their
impact is thus an empirical question. We Önd that these health institutions have a large and
statistically signiÖcant impact on the speed of drug di§usion. The point estimates imply
that the predicted time to launch is 31 percent lower in countries that have adopted the
Essential Drug List,24 and an additional 16 percent lower if they have a national formulary
in place. We Önd no signiÖcant e§ect of having a formal national drug policy which may not
be surprising since, while it signals policy intent, it is a less concrete manifestation than the
other two institutions.25 Unfortunately, it is not possible with the available data to unbundle
23While this may be true in countries with relatively low levels of per capita income, one might think
that inequality could have a smaller, or perhaps even an opposite, e§ect in higher income countries (where
less inequality might empower more consumers to be able to a§ord new drugs). When we drop high income
countries from the sample and re-estimate the model (reported later), we still Önd that inequality reduces
launch lags, but the coe¢cient is only half as large. This is consistent with the idea that there is a threshold
level of income that makes an individual a potential consumer of new drugs, and the e§ect of inequality on
the demand for drugs depends on the distribution of income around that threshold.
24This is not the e§ect on launch times for drugs which are listed on the EDL. While it would be
interesting to look at the di§usion rate speciÖcally for EDL-listed drugs, there were too few additions to the
EDL during the sample period to do this reliably.
25Of course, these variables may also serve as proxies for broader institutional quality in the country,
though we also include an index of the rule of law (from the World Bank) in this, and all subsequent,
regressions. Its estimated coe¢cient is never statistically signiÖcant, however.
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these institutions and identify the speciÖc features that make entry more attractive. This is
an important challenge but it requires more detail about the how these institutions actually
function in di§erent countries.
Finally, it may be important to recognize that the quality of regulatory agencies varies
across countries. If this is correlated with the choice of policy regimes, we might misattribute
the impact of such policies on the timing of drug launches. To address this concern, in
column (4) we include a measure of bureaucratic quality for each country/year observation,
taken from the World Bank. We expect countries with higher quality regulators to screen
more carefully, and this should generate longer launch lags on average. However, the impact
of better screening should depend on the quality of the drugómore e§ective regulators are
more likely to block, or delay, low quality drugs. To test this idea, we interact the measure
of bureaucratic quality with dummy variables for whether the drug was approved by the
FDA (BQ_FDA and BQ_nonFDA). When we do this, the estimated coe¢cients on the
demographic and policy variables remain stable. The new Önding is that higher quality
bureaucracy is associated with longer launch lags for all drugs but, as expected, the e§ect is
an order of magnitude larger for low quality drugs than for those approved by the FDA, and
both are statistically signiÖcant. The parameter estimates imply that a standard deviation
increase in bureaucratic quality increases launch lags by three percent for FDA-approved
drugs, but by almost 50 percent for low quality drugs.
6 Robustness Analysis
In this section we check the robustness of the main results to a variety of di§erent speciÖ-
cations. In each case, we introduce the changes relative to the baseline speciÖcation given
in column (4) of Table 4.
First, in column (1) of Table 5 we introduce random drug e§ects, to allow for unobserved
drug-speciÖc variation such as a drugís potential market size (i.e., di§erence in the incidence
of the targeted diseases or conditions) or di§erences in the di¢culty and cost of obtaining
regulatory approval. These random e§ects enter as a multiplicative factor in the model
for the hazard function, and are assumed to follow a Gamma distribution (this standard
formulation yields a convenient analytical expression for the likelihood function). Overall,
the results are similar to (and not statistically di§erent from) the estimates of the baseline
speciÖcation.
Second, we re-estimated the baseline regression using a more disaggregated classiÖca-
tion of therapeutic categories. This uses 61 rather than 14 therapeutic classes, based on
the second level of the World Health Organization ATC classiÖcation (for example, ëanti-
hypertensivesí as opposed to ëcardiovascular systemí). The results, given in column (2), are
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very close to the baseline speciÖcation.
Third, we examine whether our previous results for the pooled sample of drugs also
hold when the model is estimated using data only for (arguably) higher quality drugs, as
represented by those that were approved by the FDA in the U.S. Since high quality drugs
are especially important for public health, it is critical to know how policy choices a§ect
their di§usion. In addition, idiosyncratic regulatory requirements on safety and e¢cacy may
make it possible for drugs to be approved in one country but then fail to reach other markets
because they do not meet the local regulatory standards. As a consequence, an observed
failure to launch may be driven by variation in the regulatory environment, rather than by
the proÖtability calculations as modeled in Section 2. Focusing on drugs approved by the
FDA, one of the worldís most stringent regulatory authorities, helps rule this outóalbeit
without addressing problems such as a drug failing to launch because a country requires
that clinical trials be conducted on its own residents before approving a drug and these are
too costly relative to anticipated proÖts. The results are presented in column (3). All of
our main Öndings hold up, and the point estimates are very close to the estimates from
the baseline speciÖcation for both price regulation and patent policy regimes, as well as the
other covariates.
Fourth, we consider di§erences between high income and developing countries. Histori-
cally there has been much less variation in patent regimes in high-income countries than in
developing economies and there was (and remains) serious opposition to harmonization of
patent policies under the TRIPS Agreement. Opponents of harmonization on a relatively
long-duration and broad-based patent standard asserted then (and now) that the e§ects of
patent protection are likely to be more damaging for developing countries, both because
their capacity to innovate in drugs was lower (reducing any positive incentive e§ects from
patents) and because the deleterious price e§ects of patent protection could fatally under-
mine the market for drugs in poorer countries. However, the important question of impact
of patent rights on the di§usion of drugs (as opposed to their pricing) has received little
attention in these debates. We examine this question in column (4) of Table 5, where
we drop high income countries from the sample. It is striking that the qualitative results,
and most of the point estimatesóincluding the coe¢cients on the policy regimesóare very
similar to the baseline speciÖcation where we use all countries. The main di§erences are
that the impact of population is smaller among lower/middle income countries, the pro-
patent index is no longer signiÖcant, and the relative magnitudes of the impact of EDL and
national formularies are reversed.
Fifth, we extend the baseline speciÖcation to allow for interactions between price regu-
lation and patent policy regimes. There are reasons to expect the e§ect of patent regimes
to depend on whether there is strong price regulation in place. In the extreme case where
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price controls bring prices down to unit cost, patent protection would not provide any in-
centive for launch. In less extreme cases, we would expect the incentives from patent rights
to be reduced. To investigate this, we interact the dummy for price regulation with the
two extreme patent regimes, Short_Process and Long_Product.26 The results in column
(5) provide some evidence that price controls strongly dilute the incentive e§ects of patent
protection. In the absence of price regulation, the point estimates of Short_Process and
Long_Product on the launch hazard are both about 0.33 and highly signiÖcant. When
there is strong price regulation, the impact of Short_Process falls essentially to zero (the
estimate is -0.04, and the test on the sum of coe¢cients does not reject the null of zero,
p-value=0.63), while for Long_Product it declines by about 40 percent to 0.204 but is still
strongly signiÖcant (p-value <0.001). These results highlight the importance of taking the
interactions between policy instruments into account in designing overall policy strategy for
pharmaceuticals.
Finally, we investigate how indigenous innovative capacity a§ects the timing of drug
launches. A drug can be launched by the Örm that developed it, its licensee, or a domestic
competitor (often, a generic drug company) in cases where the new molecule is not protected
by a product patent. To cover launch costs, the most common avenue for competitive entry
by indigenous Örms is to innovate on the drug manufacturing processótypically involving
chemical engineeringóand protect it with a process patent. Our data do not unambiguously
identify whether products are launched in a country by the product innovator, its licensee,
or a competitor, so we cannot directly examine the role of competitive entry. Instead, we
construct a proxy to capture local technical capacity to do process innovation, using the
stock of patents in Öelds related to chemical engineering and manufacturing in each coun-
try/year, and test how this innovative capacity a§ect the timing of launches.27 When we
add this control (column 6), the estimated parameters on the patent and price regulation
(and other) variables are robust. This shows that the observed policy regimes are not sim-
ply proxies for having a strong local R&D capability (which might in turn ináuence which
policies are adopted). The point estimate on the stock of chemical patents is positive and
statistically signiÖcant, indicating that countries with greater local capacity for chemical
26We also tried interacting price regulation with Medium_Process and Medium_Product, but these two
patent regimes are highly correlated in the sample (very few countries have long product patents without long
process patents), and the results were not clear-cut. We do not interact price regulation with Short_Product
or Long_Process as neither of these variables entered signiÖcantly in the baseline regression.
27The measure is is a count of patents by application date (measured in 1000ís of patents) in any of the
international patent classes (IPC) corresponding to chemical engineering and manufacturing, as indexed by
the American Chemical Society (Data Appendix for details). The count is constructed for each country/year,
based on the country of the inventor and cumulated into a stock using a 15 percent depreciation rate and
an assumed pre-sample growth of 10 percent to initialize the stock. If a patent has multiple inventors listed,
we count the patent in each of the listed countries. Results are very similar if we just use the patent áow.
We do not use logs because nearly 40 percent of the country/year observations are zero.
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process innovation (and, presumably, therefore, local pharmaceutical manufacturing capac-
ity) have somewhat faster drug launches. This points to a potentially important role for
indigenous entry, and highlights the need for process patent protection in countries with
local technical capacity (especially where product patent rights are absent or ine§ective).
7 Endogenous Policy Regimes
Patent and price control regimes are outcomes of a political process, which raises a concern
about endogeneity. The most likely source is unobserved heterogeneity across countries in
political institutions that a§ects both the choice of policy regime and the timing of new
drug launchesóe.g., variation across countries in the proÖtability of markets, institutional
quality and policy enforcement.28 For example, Örms have greater incentives to lobby for
strong patent rights where entry is more proÖtable, which would cause us to over-estimate
the e§ect of patent rights on the timing of drug launches. But the bias can also go the other
wayócountries with weak enforcement may be more willing to adopt the appearance of
strong patent rights, inducing negative covariance of patent rights with the disturbance and
thus a downward bias. However, patent reform is often forced as a condition of entry into
new political groups (e.g., joining the European Union), bilateral trade negotiations, and
international trade agreements such as TRIPS (Sell, 2003), all of which may limit the scope
for endogenous patent regimes. Price regulation is more likely to su§er from endogeneity,
since governments have greater áexibility in setting price controls, even if in more recent
years the U.S. has pushed for limitations in the context of bilateral trade agreements (there
are examples in our sample of countries reversing price regulation reforms within a few
years).
To address concerns over endogeneity, we need instrumental variables that are corre-
lated with policy choices but do not directly a§ect the timing of drug launches (and un-
correlated with unobserved country level heterogeneity). We use a set of Öve instruments
based on political, legal and demographic characteristics of a country (details of the vari-
ables and sources are provided in the Data Appendix). The Örst is Political_Constraints
which measures the degree to which voting rights within the political (legislative and exec-
utive) structure constrains policy change (this is used in the political science literature as a
proxy for credible policy commitment). The second is Executive_Orientation which codes
whether the executive comes from a right, left or center party with respect to its orienta-
tion on economic policy (the reference category is no executive). The third instrument is
28Reverse causality is hard to rationalize in our context, at least contemporaneously. Regime choice
might be negatively correlated with past launch lags ñ long delays might induce governments to introduce
more attractive policy regimes ñ but whether this induces endogeneity bias depends heavily on the assumed
structure of errors in the launch and regime choice equations.
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Ethnolinguistic_diversity which is a measure of population diversity that has been used in
the economics and political science literature as an indicator of di¢culty in reaching and
committing to political decisions. These three instruments vary across countries and over
time. The fourth instrument, Legal_Origin, codes whether the legal system is based on
common law (U.K.), French law, or German law, with Socialist or other legal origins as the
reference category; this measure is time invariant. The last instrument is RTA which is the
cumulative number of regional trade agreements that the country has entered into, which
varies across countries and over time.
There is no compelling reason to think that the Örst three instruments either directly af-
fect launch decisions or are correlated with unobserved institutional quality or proÖtability
of local markets, conditional on the policy regimes and other controls. However, one might
be concerned that the number of RTAís reáects unobserved trade openness of an economy,
which could a§ect launch decisions. For this reason, and more generally to examine the
robustness of the parameter estimates to the choice of instruments, we use four alterna-
tive subsets of instruments. The narrowest set includes only Political_Constraints and
Executive_Orientation. The second set adds Ethnolinguistic_diversity, the third includes
Legal_Origin and the most expansive set also adds RTA.
We begin by testing the exogeneity of price controls and patent policy regimes using
the Rivers-Vuong (1988) approach. To do this, we estimate ëÖrst stageí regressions for
the choice of policy regimesóspeciÖcally, a Probit for price regulation and Ordered Pro-
bits for the process and product patent regimes. In these regressions, we use all controls
from the baseline speciÖcation of the hazard model plus the various sets of instruments
described above. While the instruments are not derived from a structural model of policy
regime choice, the instruments have statistically signiÖcant explanatory power in these re-
gressions.29 Likelihood ratio tests decisively reject the null hypothesis that the instruments
have no e§ect on the choice of price regulation and patent regimes (p-values <0.001 for all
four sets of instruments).30 Using the Örst stage regressions, we compute the generalized
29Given the importance of political economy considerations on the choice of intellectual property regimes,
constructing such a model remains a di¢cult, and open, research challenge. As indicated in the introduction,
existing studies that exploit patent reforms for identiÖcation have treated the policy changes as exogenous.
30Details of the Örst stage parameter estimates are available on request. A brief summary of the qual-
itative results for the instruments (based on statistically signiÖcant coe¢cients) is as follows. Greater
Political_Constraints (stronger policy commitment) are associated with the absence of price controls and
shorter process and product patents. Executive_Orientation from a Center party makes price controls less
likely (more likely with a Left party) and is associated with longer process and product patent protec-
tion. Higher Ethnolinguistic_diversity (weaker policy commitment) makes price controls less likely, process
patents shorter, and product patents longer. Turning to Legal_Origin, we Önd that price controls are most
strongly associated with French legal origins, followed by U.K. and German legal systems. The German
and U.K. legal origins are also associated with longer process and product patents. Finally, higher RTA
(more trade openness) is correlated with longer process and product patents as well as the presence of price
controls.
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residuals and add them as regressors in the hazard model. Exogeneity of individual policy
regimes is tested by the statistical signiÖcance of the coe¢cient on the associated generalized
residuals, and by joint tests for groups of regimesóe.g., process and/or product patents.
We strongly reject the hypothesis that price controls are exogenous, using each of four in-
strument sets (p-values: <0.001 for the Örst three sets, and 0.004 for the fourth). However,
the tests for patent regimes are mixed: we reject the hypothesis that Short_Process and
Medium_Product patent regimes are exogenous, but do not reject the hypothesis for the
other four patent regimes (using three of the four instrument sets). However, we strongly
reject the joint hypothesis test that the process patent and/or patent regimes are exogenous
(p-values<0.001) using each of the instrument sets.
In view of these mixed Öndings, we proceed to estimate the hazard model allowing for
endogenous policy regimes. To do this, we follow the approach of Lillard (1993) and formu-
late the model as a system of four simultaneous equations: the hazard launch equation and
the three policy regime equations (probit for price regulation, ordered probits for process
and product patent regimes). Each of the regime equations includes all country-level vari-
ables from the hazard model plus the instruments described above. This model is estimated
by full information maximum likelihood.31
In Table 6 we summarize the FIML parameter estimates for the patent and price regu-
lation variables in the hazard equation (For brevity, we suppress coe¢cients for the other
controls and the ëancillaryí policy regime equations. Details are available on request). These
estimates were obtained using a piece-wise linear spline for the duration-dependent compo-
nent of the log-hazard, which is capable of approximating a variety of parametric models, so
the parameters are not strictly comparable to the Weibull estimates in Tables 4 and 5. For
reference, columns (1) and (2) present the parameters obtained from estimating the base-
line speciÖcation of the hazard model as a single equation, and it is worth noting that the
estimates in columns (1) and (2) are very similar to those from the Weibull speciÖcation.32
Column (2) includes a normally distributed country random e§ect, with little impact on
the estimated coe¢cients in column (1).33
31Two points should be noted. First, we introduce correlation between the disturbances in the launch
and regime equations by adding a common random country e§ect to each (its coe¢cient is normalized in
the process patent equation). In the absence of such correlation, the regimes would not be endogenous in
the launch equation (which the Rivers-Vuong test rejected). E§orts to estimate the launch equation by
non-linear GMM as a less restrictive alternative to the FIML procedure used did not succeed in obtaining
convergence. With time-varying covariates, the data form a large unbalanced panel in which each observation
in the GMM objective function (observed launch status minus predicted in the Önal period) is conditional
on the entire history of each drug-country up to the last period observed, making the selection of valid
instruments very challenging.
32The duration-dependent part of the hazard function is modeled using year dummies for t 2 [0; 9] and
t > 9. Estimated coe¢cients on these time dummies imply a pattern of duration dependence consistent with
a Weibull distribution with slope parameter of about 0.6, through to about 12 years.
33Not surprisingly, estimated coe¢cients on some of the other country-speciÖc variables that change
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Columns (3)-(6) present the FIML estimates for the policy regime variables using alter-
native sets of instruments with a country random e§ect common across equations. Three
main conclusions stand out. First, endogeneity of policy regimes leads us to under-estimate
their impacts on the timing of drug launches in an uninstrumented single-equation model:
the estimated impact of price regulation and the patent regimes here are generally larger
than those obtained when the policy regimes as treated as exogenous. Note that if endo-
geneity were driven by unobserved heterogeneity in the proÖtability of markets, we would
expect an upward bias in the magnitude of the coe¢cients. To the contrary, our Öndings
suggest that the endogeneity bias is more consistent with negative correlation between the
adoption of strong policy regimes and unmeasured aspects of political and legal institutions,
such as enforcement of patent rights. Second, the overall pattern of policy impacts is similar
to what we found in the earlier regressions. Process patents raise the hazard of launch (i.e.,
reduce launch lags), and the impact increases with the duration of such patents, though
the di§erences are not all statistically signiÖcant. (Note that in the earlier results for the
baseline speciÖcation we found no signiÖcant impact for long process patents, but when we
use instruments we do). Again, as before, we Önd thatMedium_Product and Long_Product
have large impacts on launch lags, while short product patents have little e§ect. Third, the
pattern of estimated parameters is fairly robust across the di§erent instrument sets.34
8 Policy Simulations
In this section we simulate how di§erent policy choices a§ect the speed of new drug di§usion.
The metric we adopt is the predicted time it takes for 25 percent of drugs to be launched
(LAG25 ) under di§erent counterfactual policy regimes. Using our estimated parameters,
we solve for the value of the 25th percentile of the estimated ëfailureí function for each
drug/country observation, conditional on covariates, and then examine the median value
across observations.35 We begin with a benchmark computation of LAG25 for a regime
with no patent protection or price regulation, and then introduce three counterfactual policy
regimes: short process patents, long product patents, and price controls. Table (7) shows
results for both for all drugs and for subset of FDA-approved drugs, and then for low,
middle and high income countries.
relatively little over time (such as health expenditures/GDP) are sensitive to including a country random
e§ect.
34There are some exceptions: the impacts of Medium_Product and Long_Product are notably larger in
columns (4), (5) and (6), and in column (5) the coe¢cient on Short_Process is not signiÖcant while the
coe¢cient on Short_Product is signiÖcant at the 5 percent level.
35To do this, we set the values of the time-varying covariates at their sample means (over time) for each
drug/country observation. We focus on the median value of LAG25 because many drugs are never launched
in a number of countries, so the distribution of LAG25 is sharply skewed, rendering the mean (or median)
of the predicted survival function a somewhat misleading summary statistic.
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Panel A of Table 7 is based on the baseline Weibull regression estimates from column
(4) of Table 4 which, as discussed in the previous section, likely under-estimate the impact
of policy choices on launch lags. The results further conÖrm our descriptive Öndings that
di§usion of new drugs is slow, and varies across drug and income categories.36 In the
benchmark case with no patents or price controls, it takes 4.63 years for 25 percent of drugs
to be launched in the pooled sample. This falls to 3.01 years for FDA-approved drugs, which
is good news from a welfare perspective. But there is substantial variation across income
categoriesóthe median lags are more than three times longer in low income countries (8.85
years) as compared to high income countries (2.60 years). Setting the patent regime to
short process patents only (i.e., Short_Process = 1 and price controls and all other patent
variables = 0) reduces predicted launch lags by about 25 percent. Slightly shorter launch
lags are estimated for a regime with no process patents but long product patents (and
no price controls). Introducing price controls in a regime with no patents increases lag
times by 29 percent above the benchmark. Recall that given the functional form of the
baseline empirical model, the percentage e§ects of these policy regimes are additive: thus
introducing both price controls and Long_Product generates a predicted median value of
LAG25 of 4.09 years. In other words, price regulation removes most of accelerated di§usion
induced by long product patents.
Panel B presents the median predicted launch lags when we use the FIML parame-
ter estimates on the policy variables, which take into account the endogeneity of policy
regimes.37 Using these coe¢cients, product patents emerge as much more e§ective than
process patents (69 percent reduction in launch lags compared to 29 percent), and price
regulation has a very large impact, more than doubling launch lags.
In both panels, the same pattern of results holds for the subset of FDA-approved drugs,
and for low, middle, and high income countries. In low income countries, LAG25 is de-
pressingly high in the benchmark case, at almost nine years. Notice that, based on these
results, a policy regime directed solely at lowering prices on drugs that have been already
been launched (no patents, and strong price controls) would increase launch lags very sub-
stantially to over three times longer than in a ëpro-innovatorí regime with no price controls
and long product patents.
Some qualiÖcations should be kept in mind. First, these calculations are not a welfare
assessment of di§erent regimesóthat would require, at a minimum, consideration of how
these policies they a§ect drug prices. This is extremely di¢cult unless one can model both
36Although similar to the numbers in Table 3, note that these Ögures are not directly comparable since
they control for economic and demographic variables, drug therapeutic class, and set the patent and price
controls policy variables to counterfactual values.
37SpeciÖcally we recompute the predicted launch lags from the Weibull model after substituting the
coe¢cients on the patent and price controls variables with values from the FIML estimates in column (3) of
Table 6 (which has a minimal, conservative instrument list).
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the demand sideóas a practical matter, this requires restricting the analysis to speciÖc
classes of drugs (e.g., Chaudry, Goldberg and Gia, 2006)óand the supply side, i.e., the
investment required for launch. Second, because our empirical model is not structural,
counterfactual assessment of policies is subject to the Lucas critique, among other issues.
A third, and related, point is that countries develop institutions, and invest in human
capital, over long time periods, and in ways that both ináuence, and in turn are ináuenced
by, the policy regimes they adopt. Thus there may be important, and unmodeled, path
dependencies driving observed outcomesóand the estimated policy impacts shown here
may take many years to unfold. Any assessment of a new policy regime needs to take into
account the capacity of the country to adapt and the costs of doing so.
9 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies how patent rights and price regulation a§ect launch lags for new drugs.
Using new data on launches of 642 new molecules in 76 countries during 1983-2002, we show
that, all else equal, longer and more extensive patent protection accelerated di§usion, while
price regulation strongly delayed it. Health policy institutions, and economic factors that
make markets more proÖtable, also sped up di§usion. These results hold both for develop-
ing countries and high income countries, and the results are robust to using instrumental
variables to address the endogeneity of policy regimes. Our Öndings also raise the broader
point, not limited to pharmaceuticals, that patent rights can have an important impact on
the di§usion of new innovations as well as on the rate at which new innovations are created.
Of course, the same policies that promote faster launchóstronger patent rights and
the absence of price regulationóare also those that raise prices. This highlights the basic
tradeo§ countries face between making new drug therapies available and making them
a§ordable. Finding ways to best mitigate the adverse e§ects of this tradeo§ is a major
challenge.
There are two main directions for future research. One is to study how severe the
tradeo§ between faster di§usion and higher prices actually isói.e., how much prices are
raised by stronger process or product patent protectionóby using data on sales and prices
within countries with di§erent patent regimes. A second interesting direction for research
is to develop a structural model of drug launches which could be used to back out unob-
served launch costs in each country and then to conduct important counterfactual policy
experiments. One question of particular interest is the e§ects on global drug di§usion of
introducing multilateral recognition of drug trials and regulatory approval.
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Data Appendix
New Drug Launches
The phenomenon of interest here is the dating of the launch of each new drug in each
country. This was derived from the dating of launches of drug products, which contain the
new drug, in combination with inactive ingredients and potentially other active ingredients.
The distinction between ëdrugí and ëdrug productí is signiÖcant. Not all new drugs are
launched as exactly the same product in all countries. A given ëactive moietyí may be
approved as di§erent salts or esters in di§erent countries (as sulfate, hydrochloride, maleate
etc.) or in di§erent galenical forms (tablet, injectable, topical cream etc.), or may be sold
in combination with di§erent sets of other active ingredients.
Drug launches were identiÖed from two sources of data, in which the unit of observation
is a drug product. The Örst is the December 2002 version of the ìLifeCycle: Drug Launchesî
database obtained from IMS Health, Inc. This Öle contained 187,725 observations on retail
drug product launches for the period 1982-2002. The unit of observation is product-country-
year, with each observation recording: (1) the trade name (proprietary product name, or
brand name); (2) a listing of active ingredients using non-proprietary generic chemical name;
(3) the composition, listing the formulation (capsule, syrup, powder etc.) and amounts,
strength or concentration of the active ingredient(s); (4) the date the product goes on sale;
and (5) the therapeutic class of the product using the World Health Organizationís ëATCí
Anatomical Therapeutical Chemical classiÖcation system at the third level. This database
covers all therapeutic classes, but not all countries. Coverage of countries increased over
time, with product launches observed in 45 countries in 1982, increasing to 66 in the early
1990s, and to 76 by the end of the sample. In two cases country was coded by IMS
as a region: French West Africa, consisting of Benin, Cameroon, Congo, Cote díIvoire,
Gabon, Guinea, and Senegal; and Central America consisting of Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. Notably, India was not included in this database
during this period.
The drug launch data for India were obtained from a second source, the ìFirstIndiaî
dataset of product sales compiled by ORG MARG, a market research company. This covers
the period 1967 to 1997 but only for a partial set of therapeutic classes, namely antibiotics,
cancer, and antiulcer. There were 498 observations on brand name, active ingredient(s),
therapeutic class, and launch date.
Identifying drug launches in these data consistently across countries and over time was
a serious challenge. In the data, 14 percent of records had no listing of active ingredients,
only a brand name, for about one Öfth of which the active ingredient could be ërecoveredí
through lookup of the brand name or through parsing of the composition Öeld. Moreover,
24 percent of records were for multi-ingredient or combination products: in some cases more
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than 20 ingredients were listed. About 20 percent of products fell into categories in which
active ingredients were prohibitively di¢cult to identify consistently (vaccines, biologics,
hormones, allergens, immune globulins etc.), appeared to be for non-prescription products
such as nostrums, over-the-counter, or proprietary formulations, herbal and homeopathic
medicines, or were for ënon-drugí medical products, such as blood-testing strips, imaging
contrast agents, non-medicinal or inactive ingredients or excipients, diagnostics, and surgical
solutions.
As a preliminary step, we therefore excluded 17,452 records for products whose in-
gredients could not be identiÖed. After a very careful e§ort to identify brand names of
known drugs, we believe that no instances of launches of new drugs were excluded for this
reason. We further excluded 37,199 records in therapeutic classes largely populated with
non-prescription or hard to identify products,38 and 2,274 records for vaccines.
Remaining records were ëunpackedí to give one observation per ingredient per product,
with the exception of 29 combination drugs given a distinct non-proprietary name in the
British Pharmacopeia where ingredients were combined.39 This created an additional 29,784
observations, and was done to be ëover-inclusiveí in identifying drug launches: while many
drug products combine active ingredients, treating all combinations of new and old chemical
entities as distinct products would result in spuriously high counts of new products, and
under-identiÖcation of launches of new entities.
In principle each active ingredient is unambiguously identiÖed by the generic name,
in practice these are not fully standardized, or may use spelling variations from di§erent
languages, or may not have been assigned. After excluding non-drug or hard-to-identify
products and ingredients, we observe 9,065 distinct active ingredients in the remaining
115,123 observations on country and ingredient. Considerable e§ort was invested in cod-
ing these consistently, to avoid under-identiÖcation of drug launches. A variety of online
and hardcopy reference sources were consulted, including: the ChemIDplus database main-
38Products in the following therapeutic classes: toothpaste and dentifrices, digestives, vitamins, mineral
supplements, tonics, laxatives, anti-anemics, topical antihaemorrhoidals, certain dermatologicals (emollients
and protectives, wound and ulcer preps, anti-pruritics, disinfectants, medicated dressings, acne, miscella-
neous), parenteral nutrition, bacterial immunostimulants, smoking cessation, herbal cough and cold, oph-
thalmics, otologicals, allergens, herbal and homoeopathic medicines. These were identiÖed through the ATC
codes (A1A, A9, A11, A12, A13, A6, B3A, B3B, C5A, D2, D3, D4, D8, D9, D10, D11, K, L3X, N7B, R5F,
S, T, V) or through manual examination. Vitamins and non-prescription or OTC drugs were identiÖed from
reference sources such as the Physicansís Desk Reference for Nonprescription Drugs and Dietary Supple-
ments. Herbal and homeopathic products were identiÖed by hand inspection, lookup in Physiciansí Desk
Reference for Herbal Medicine, or being manufactured by a company specializing in herbal products e.g.
Arkopharma, Weleda.
39These are the drug combinations with demonstrated synergistic e§ects: co-amoxiclav, co-amilofruse, co-
amilozide, co-amoxiclav, co-beneldopa, co-bucafapap, co-careldopa, co-climasone, co-codamol, co-codaprin,
co-cyprindiol, co-drydamol, co-erynsulÖsox, co-áuampicil, co-áumactone, co-hycodapap, co-methiamol, co-
oxycodapap, co-phenotrope, co-proxamol, co-simalcite, co-spironozide, co-tenidone, co-tetroxazine, co-
triamterzide, co-trifamole, co-trimazine, co-trimoxazole, and co-zidocapt.
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tained by the US National Library of Medicine, the WHO-MedNet database, the University
of Alberta DrugBank database, the DrugBase database published by Wissenschaftliche Ver-
lagsgesellschaft Stuttgart, the Health Canada Non-Medicinal Products Database, the FDAís
Inactive Ingredients Database, the Kyoto University and University of Tokyo KEGG DRUG
database, and current and historical editions of the Martindale Complete Drug Reference
published by The Pharmaceutical Press, theMerck Index, the Index Nominum published by
the Swiss Pharmaceutical Society, and the USP Dictionary of United States Adopted Names
(USAN) and International Drug Names published by the U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention.
When possible, generic chemical names were matched to the WHOís listing of International
Nonproprietary Names (INNs); when an INN was not available, the USP USAN, British
Approved Name, or Japanese Approved Name was used.
As a further measure to avoid under-identiÖcation of country launches, the parts of active
ingredient names corresponding to salts, esters or non-covalent derivatives were removed to
arrive at the ëactive moietyí. This corresponds roughly to the New Chemical Entity in U.S.
usage. Treating di§erent salts, esters and derivatives as distinct entities would result in a
signiÖcantly larger number of new drugs. For each of the 2,265 such chemical entities in the
source dataset we determine the Örst worldwide launch date, based on the earliest of (1)
the Örst date it appears in the IMS or ORG MARG datasets, (2) the Örst date it appears
in the FDAís drugs@fda approvals database, (3) the Örst date it was listed as approved
for marketing in any country in the Pharmaprojects database. To avoid problems with
left-censoring of launch dates in 1982 in the IMS data, we exclude any drugs for which the
Örst worldwide launch date deÖned this way was before 1983. We also exclude drugs that
were only launched in Japan and Taiwan and/or Korea, which appear to reáect medical
practice idiosyncratic to this region. This leaves us with 642 drugs, for which we observe
17,189 drug-country observations on the timing of launches.
To prepare this dataset for survival analysis, we use the Örst worldwide launch date to
determine t=0 for each molecule, and then for each drug-country combination create annual
observations for the time-varying and non-time varying covariates described below for each
year until either the drug is launched in that country or is censored. Care was taken to
exclude country-years where a drug was not at risk of launching (as observed in these data),
for example if data were not reported for that country until after the Örst worldwide launch
date, or if the drug were in a therapeutic class not covered in these data for that country,
for example antihypertensives in India. This gives a total of 298,605 observations on 38,180
drug-country combinations, with the launch date was censored for 20,991 drug-country
combinations.
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Explanatory variables
Patent Protection
We construct measures of the availability and duration of patent protection for (a)
pharmaceutical products and (b) chemical processes is coded for each country-year, along
with presence of enforcement mechanisms.
Two sources were used. Data compiled by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008)
who give dummy variables coded every 5 years 1960-2000 for up to 120 countries on (1)
ëCoverageíói.e., availability of patent protection for di§erent classes of subject matter, here
the relevant category is chemicals and pharmaceuticals, process and product; (2) patent
term, measured as years from Öling or years from grant; (3) treaty membership in PCT,
Paris Convention and UPOV; and (4) presence of various enforcement mechanisms and
other factors impacting the scope of rights, such as preliminary injunctions, requirements
to work, contributory infringement, compulsory licensing etc. This information was cross-
referenced against the text of relevant statues and treaties, published in World Patent Law
and Practice: Patent Statutes, Regulations, and Treaties by John P. Sinnott and William
J. Cotreau (New York: M. Bender, 1974, seriatim), and Patents Throughout the World,
an annually updated looseleaf publication (New York: West Group). The Statutes, Reg-
ulations, and Treaties information are taken as deÖnitive regarding dating of changes in
patent term, coverage of pharmaceuticals and chemical processes, patent term extensions,
duration of term for foreign versus domestic applicants, and provide some ability to ëback
Öllí the Ginarte-Park data to identify more precisely changes in the patent regime. There
are occasional inconsistencies and conáicts between national law and multinational treaties
e.g. Andean Pact, Bangui Agreement. In these cases, the provisions of the national law are
taken as deÖnitive.
Using these data we deÖne: Patent_Term = Max (Years from grant +2, Years from
Öling). The distribution of country/year observations by patent term is as follows:
Patent_Term 0 3 7 10 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 22
No. obs 9 17 21 77 59 15 83 35 175 39 38 694 12
Using the patent term, we deÖne the following process and product patent regimes:
Short_Process=1 if chemical processes patentable and 0 <Patent_Term  12
Short_Product=1 if pharmaceutical products patentable and 0 <Patent_Term  12
Medium_Process=1 if chemical processes patentable and 13 Patent_Term  17
Medium_Product=1 if pharmaceutical products patentable and 13 Patent_Term  17
Long_Process=1 if chemical processes patentable and Patent_Term > 17
Long_Product=1 if pharmaceutical products patentable and Patent_Term > 17
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Pro-patent Index = sum of dummies for whether:
a) patent term is the same for domestic and foreign applicants
b) preliminary injunctions are available
c) infringer can be liable for contributory infringement
d) burden of proof of infringement is reversed for process inventions
e) patents cannot be revoked for failure to work
f) there is no requirement to work the patent, or can be satisÖed by importation
g) there is no compulsory licensing
h) term extensions are available for pharmaceuticals
Price Controls
Each countryís price control regime was coded as None/Some/Extensive from the sources
listed in Lanjouw (2005). The designation ëSomeí means that the country has formal price
control regulation but it covers only a subset of drugs. ëExtensiveí means that the regula-
tion covers most drugs and/or is viewed in the sources as particularly restrictive. In the
regressions a dummy variable for price control regime = Extensive is used.
Demographic and Income Variables
Age distribution: For each country-year, the total population, and percentage of the
population over 65 years old are taken from the World Bank,World Development Indicators.
We also used the percentage of the population under 5 years old, but found no e§ect in the
regressions.
Income per capita: For each country, annual values of real GDP per capita (RGDPCH)
are taken from the Penn World Table version 6.2
Income inequality: We use the Gini coe¢cient as reported in the World Bankís World De-
velopment Indicators. Since there are rarely more than two observations per country 1975-
2005, missing values are interpolated using Örst-observation-carried-back for years prior to
the Örst observed value, and then last-observation-carried-forward subsequently.
Health care expenditures: For each country, total health care expenditure as percent of
GDP is taken from the World Bankís World Development Indicators. This is only con-
sistently available 1990 onwards, and missing data are interpolated using Örst-observation-
carried-back for years prior to 1990.
Health Institutions
We use the following dummy variables:
EDL = 1 if the country has adopted an Essential Drug List
NDP =1 if the country has adopted a National Drug Policy
NF = 1 if the country has adopted a National Formulary
Each of these variables varies across countries and time. Taken from sources listed in
Lanjouw (2005).
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Local Technical Capacity
Chemicals Patents is a count of U.S. patents by application date in any of the IPC
classes corresponding to chemical engineering and manufacturing, as indexed by the Amer-
ican Chemical Society (these include Pesticides, Medicial Preparations, Chemical Methods
and Processes, Inorganic Chemistry, Fertilizers, Organic Chemistry, Macromolecules, Dyes
and Paints, Petrochemicals, Soaps and Oils, Beverages and Vinegar, Microbiology and
Fermentation, Sugar, and Analyzing Materials); plus Chemical or Physical Laboratory Ap-
paratus, Biocides and Pest Repellants, and Apparatus for Enzymology or Microbiology.
This count is constructed for each country/year, based on the country of the inventor(s)
listed on the patent, and then converted to a stock using a 15 percent depreciation rate.
Governance
Rule of Law and Regulatory Quality index values and rank order (for 181 countries)
published in World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002
(not available before 1996). We use Örst-observation-carried-back for years prior to 1996,
then last-observation-carried-forward.
Instrumental Variables
Political_Constraints: a measure of credible policy commitment (the degree of political
constraints on policy change). It is derived from a spatial model of political interaction and
is based on the number of independent veto points in the di§erent branches of the political
system and the distribution of political preferences both across and within these branches.
Higher values represent greater political constraints (and thus greater policy commitment).
For details see Henisz (2000).
Executive_Orientation: a dummy variable that codes whether the executive comes from
a right, left or center party with respect to its orientation on economic policy. Both of
these variables vary both across countries and over time. Source: World Bank Database of
Political Institutions: Changes and Variable DeÖnitions (Philip Keefer, December 2009).
Ethnolinguistic_diversity: a measure commonly used as an indicator of di¢culty in
reaching and committing to political decisions. This index varies across countries and over
time. For details, La Porta et al. (1999).
Legal_Origin: The historical origins of the legal system for each country is coded as
either common law (U.K.), French law, German law, Socialist or Scandanavian (Öxed for
each country over time). For details, see La Porta et al. (1999).
Regional Trade Agreements (RTA): the cumulative number of regional trade agreements
that the country has entered as of a given year. This varies across countries and over time.
These data were compiled from Table 3 of Baier and Bergstrand (2007), supplemented with
the WTO web site (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.xls). We
thank Keith Head for providing a clean version of these data.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (country-year observations)
Variables Mean Std. Dev Minimum Maximum
Policy Regimes
Short_Process 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
Medium_Process 0.22 0.42 0.00 1.00
Long_Process 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00
Short_Product 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00
Medium_Product 0.16 0.37 0.00 1.00
Long_Product 0.59 0.49 0.00 1.00
Pro-patent Index 0.42 0.23 0.00 1.00
Price Controls 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
Health Institutions
National Drug Policy 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00
Essential Drug List 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
National Formulary 0.83 0.38 0.00 1.00
Other Variables
Population (millions) 49.44 119.05 0.41 1034.17
GDP/cap (thousands) 12.58 8.83 1.12 48.59
Health/GDP (percent) 4.48 8.83 0.20 15.78
Gini Coefficient 39.25 10.05 19.49 63.00
% Pop Age 65+ 8.40 4.95 1.40 18.07
Bureaucratic Quality 67.96 24.71 16.67 100.00
Table 2. Global Diffusion of New Drug Launches
No. of 
countries
FDA-approved 
drugs
FDA priority 
review drugs
N (%) (%) (%)
1-3 145 23 13 13
4-10 101 16 12 10
11-25 133 21 20 16
26+ 263 41 55 62
Notes: Table shows the number of countries in which each drug is launched 
during the period 1983-2002, with no adjustment for censoring of launch lags 
or for changes in the number of countries present in the data.
All drugs
Sample
Table 3.  Diffusion Times for Drug Launches
Time by which 25% launched (years)
All Drugs
FDA-approved 
drugs
FDA Priority 
Review drugs
Income Level
Low Income 8.98 6.99 5.99
Middle Income 4.05 3.01 2.99
High Income 2.01 1.97 1.02
Patent Regime
None 7.99 4.02 4.01
Short 6.00 4.42 3.99
Medium 5.43 3.99 3.98
Long 2.56 1.99 1.45
Price Regulation
Weak/None 2.99 1.99 1.97
Strong 4.98 3.06 3.01
Overall 3.41 2.45 2.00
NOTES: Table entries are based on the estimated Kaplan-Meier survivor function, which adjusts for 
censoring of launch lags.  Countries are categorized as Low, Middle, or High income based on the World 
Bank's categories and their GDP per capita at PPP in 2001. Based on 298,605 observations. FDA-approved 
sample has 163,853 observations, and the FDA-priority-reviewed sample 64,778.
Table 4.  Weibull Model of Drug Launch: Proportional Hazard Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Elapsed time 0.614** 0.618** 0.611** 0.611**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(population) 0.074** 0.076** 0.077** 0.083**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log(GDP/cap) 0.247** 0.023 0.015 0.048*
(0.015) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
Log(Health/GDP) 0.313** 0.259** 0.275**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Price Controls -0.153** -0.171** -0.140** -0.153**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019)
Pro-patent Index 0.372** 0.169** 0.154** 0.220**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.054) (0.056)
Short_Process 0.117 0.175** 0.180** 0.179**
(0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
Medium_Process 0.199** 0.171** 0.159** 0.164**
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) (0.055)
Long_Process 0.017 0.031 0.004 0.053
(0.063) (0.059) (0.060) (0.060)
Short_Product 0.130* 0.020 -0.064 -0.019
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
Medium_Product 0.077 0.174** 0.142** 0.130**
(0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042)
Long_Product 0.335** 0.303** 0.260** 0.229**
(0.058) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055)
FDA-approved drug 1.357** 1.375** 1.355** 0.540**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.065)
Gini Coefficient 0.014** 0.012**
(0.001) (0.001)
% Pop Age 65+ 0.026** 0.024**
(0.003) (0.003)
BQ* FDA drugs -0.001
(0.001)
BQ* non-FDA drugs -0.012**
(0.001)
Rule of Law index 0.001
(0.011)
National Drug Policy 0.028 0.009
(0.032) (0.032)
Essential Drug List 0.189** 0.204**
(0.032) (0.033)
National Formulary 0.098** 0.093**
(0.027) (0.027)
ATC Dummies YES YES YES YES
No. Observations 298,605 298,605 298,605 298,605
log-likelihood -45,413 -45,237 -45,122 -45,034
NOTES: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors clustered on country-drug in 
parentheses.
Table 5.  Weibull Model of Drug Launch: Robustness Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Drug Random 
Effects
Level 2 
Therapeutic 
Class Effects
FDA-approved 
drugs
Low/Middle 
Income
Interactions of 
Patents with 
Price Controls
Local innovation 
Capacity
Price Controls -0.214** -0.157** -0.181** -0.205** -0.040 -0.147**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.021) (0.029) (0.037) (0.019)
Pro-patent Index 0.370** 0.229** 0.231** -0.036 0.220** 0.187**
(0.054) (0.055) (0.061) (0.096) (0.055) (0.057)
Short_Process 0.185** 0.168* 0.134 0.172* 0.325** 0.171*
(0.068) (0.067) (0.075) (0.079) (0.073) (0.067)
Medium_Process 0.138* 0.163** 0.140* 0.188** 0.174** 0.156**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.061) (0.062) (0.055) (0.055)
Long_Process 0.019 0.049 0.037 0.034 0.025 0.046
(0.062) (0.060) (0.066) (0.068) (0.061) (0.061)
Short_Product -0.023 -0.006 -0.048 -0.017 -0.015 -0.028
(0.067) (0.066) (0.073) (0.076) (0.066) (0.066)
Medium_Product 0.175** 0.144** 0.112* 0.064 0.144** 0.131**
(0.044) (0.041) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.042)
Long_Product 0.279** 0.239** 0.191** 0.241** 0.328** 0.232**
(0.057) (0.054) (0.059) (0.074) (0.061) (0.055)
Short_Process  x Price_controls -0.368**
(0.080)
Long_Product x Price_controls -0.124**
(0.043)
Stock of Chemicals patents 0.001**
(0.001)
log-likelihood -38903 -43681 -35101 -20602 -45023 -45030
NOTES: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 1 percent. Standard errors clustered on country-drug in parentheses. 298,605 observations, except for columns 
(3) and (4) which have 163,853 and 168,684 respectively. All equations also include the other explanatory variables in column (4) of Table (4). 
Table 6. Hazard Model of Drug Launch: Instrumental Variable (FIML) Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline 
Country 
Random Effect
Political Constraints, 
Executive Orientation
+ Ethno-Linguistic 
Diversity + Legal Origins + Number RTA's
Price Controls -0.155** -0.189** -0.491** -0.497** -0.596** -0.566**
(0.020) (0.023) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026)
Pro-patent Index 0.147** 0.164** 0.211** 0.221** 0.212** 0.170**
(0.056) (0.068) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.057)
Short_Process 0.143** 0.151** 0.211** 0.214** -0.099 0.098
(0.065) (0.074) (0.067) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
Medium_Process 0.121** 0.105* 0.344** 0.352** 0.177** 0.269**
(0.053) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053) (0.050) (0.051)
Long_Process 0.026 -0.118 0.431** 0.446** 0.423** 0.313**
(0.053) (0.078) (0.059) (0.051) (0.058) (0.059)
Short_Product -0.032 0.021 0.031 0.025 0.155** 0.009
(0.065) (0.075) (0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.068)
Medium_Product 0.156** 0.142** 0.425** 0.423** 0.440** 0.362**
(0.041) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042) (0.039) (0.040)
Long_Product 0.173** 0.311** 0.721** 0.719** 0.676** 0.639**
(0.054) (0.065) (0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.054)
log-likehood -90666 -86631 -605230 -603247 -593124 -585949
NOTES: * significant at 5 percent and ** significant at 1 percent.  298,605 observations. All regressions include a piece-wise linear specification of the baseline duration 
dependency (dummies for years t=0,...,9 and t>9), the full set of controls for demographic variables, bureaucratic quality, and therapeutic category dummies (as in Table 4, 
column (4) and Table 5.)  Columns (1) and (2) are single equation estimates.  Columns (3)-(6) are estimates using the approach developed by Lillard (1993), i.e. FIML 
estimation of a four-equation system in which the process patent, product patent and price control regimes are all treated as endogenous and are estimated as ordered 
probit regressions for patent regimes and probit for price controls.  The same set of instruments is used in each of the policy regime equations, but varies across 
specifications in the table (as indicated in the column headings).  Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Table 7.  Impact of Policy Regimes on Launch Lags 
Panel A: Median lag to predicted 25% diffusion using baseline coefficients
All drugs FDA-approved drugs Low income Middle income High income
Benchmark 4.63 3.01 8.85 4.91 2.60
Regime 1: Short_Process 3.45 2.25 6.61 3.67 1.94
Regime 2: Long_Product 3.18 2.07 6.09 3.38 1.79
Regime 3: Price controls 5.95 3.87 11.38 6.31 3.35
Panel B: Median lag to predicted 25% diffusion using FIML coefficients on policy variables
Regime 1: Short_Process 3.28 2.13 6.27 3.48 1.84
Regime 2: Long_Product 1.42 0.93 2.72 1.51 0.80
Regime 3: Price controls 10.34 6.73 19.77 10.98 5.82
No. observations 38,180         26,319      3,350        17,976      16,854      
NOTES: Table entries are median values of 38,180 observations on the 25th percentile of the estimated Weibull failure function.  In Panel A parameters 
are from from the Weibull model in Table 4, column (4), and in Panel B the estimated coefficients on policy variables are from Table 6,  column (3).
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Figure 2: Fraction of Drugs Launched By Income 
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Figure 3: Fraction of Drugs Launched By Patent Regime 
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Figure 4: Fraction of Drugs Launched By Price Controls 
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Launched 
Within 5 Yrs
Launched & 
FDA-approved Country
Product 
Patent 
Regime
Process 
Patent 
Regime
Price 
Control 
Regime
Launched 
Within 5 Yrs
Launched & 
FDA-
approved
ARGENTINA N,S,M,N S,M,L S,N 45.3 56.5 KUWAIT N,L S,L S 21.5 25.4
AUSTRALIA M,L M,L N 27.3 38.2 LATVIA L L N 20.1 23.2
AUSTRIA N,L L S 44.4 58.0 LEBANON N,L M,L S 19.7 22.3
BANGLADESH M M N 9.7 11.0 LUXEMBOURG L L S 25.4 29.5
BELGIUM L L S 36.3 47.5 MALAYSIA L,M L,M N 20.2 27.1
BENIN S,L S,L S 12.2 14.0 MEXICO N,L N,L N,S,N 37.4 48.7
BOLIVIA L L N 8.6 10.1 MOROCCO L,N,L N,L S 13.7 16.1
BRAZIL N,M,S N,S S,N 31.6 42.0 NETHERLANDS L L N 39.4 50.4
BULGARIA L L N 18.3 21.1 NEW ZEALAND L L N 28.8 39.0
CAMEROON S,L S,L S 12.2 14.0 NORWAY L L N 47.0 53.5
CANADA L L N 37.5 54.6 PAKISTAN M,L M,L S 14.8 16.9
CHILE M N,M N 28.8 36.6 PANAMA M M N,S 28.5 36.6
COLOMBIA N,M,L N,M,L S,N 31.5 42.5 PARAGUAY N M S 19.4 23.7
COSTA RICA N,S,L L,S,L N 28.5 36.6 PERU N,M,L N,M,L,N S,N 20.6 26.4
COTE D'IVOIRE S,L S,L S 12.2 14.0 PHILIPPINES L L N 31.8 40.4
CZECH REPUBLIC L L N 41.9 46.9 POLAND L L N 34.2 39.6
DENMARK M,L M,L N 44.9 59.4 PORTUGAL N,L M,L N 24.6 28.3
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC M M N 21.3 26.8 PUERTO RICO L L N 48.7 59.6
ECUADOR N,M,L M,L S 22.1 28.5 RUSSIA L L N 14.3 16.7
EGYPT N M S 10.3 13.8 SAUDI ARABIA L,M L,M S 13.7 19.5
EL SALVADOR M M N 28.5 36.6 SENEGAL S,L S,L N 12.2 14.0
FINLAND L,N,L L S,N 43.5 59.1 SINGAPORE L L N 25.5 33.3
FRANCE L L S 37.5 44.2 SLOVAK REPUBLIC L L N 34.4 39.5
GABON S,L S,L S 12.2 14.0 SLOVENIA L L N,S 28.7 33.8
GERMANY L L N 55.0 67.9 SOUTH AFRICA L L N,S 28.8 39.0
GREECE M,L M,L S 35.7 46.8 SOUTH KOREA M,L M,L S,N 42.6 46.9
GUATEMALA N M,S S,N 28.5 36.6 SPAIN N,L L S 39.1 47.5
GUINEA S,L S,L N 12.2 14.0 SWEDEN L L S,N 38.9 53.0
HONDURAS L,M L,M N,S 28.5 36.6 SWITZERLAND L L N 44.4 58.4
HONG KONG L L N 27.7 37.3 TAIWAN L L N 28.3 35.1
HUNGARY N,L L N 36.6 41.2 THAILAND N,L M,L N 30.4 40.9
INDIA N S S,N 8.2 10.9 TUNISIA N L S 8.2 9.2
INDONESIA N,M,L N,M,L N 19.5 25.9 TURKEY M,L M,L S 25.1 33.5
IRELAND L L N 38.5 50.8 UK L L N 50.6 66.5
ISRAEL L L S 24.0 34.0 UAE N S N 21.1 25.0
ITALY L L S,N 52.3 60.3 URUGUAY N,M M N 37.6 43.9
JAPAN L L N 31.9 34.4 USA L L N 53.1 80.0
JORDAN L L S 12.9 15.8 VENEZUELA N,M,L N,M,L N 24.6 32.1
Percent of Drugs Percent of Drugs
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